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This paper examines the causal e¤ects of bank size on banks survival, asset
quality, and leverage. Two forces drive these e¤ects: increasing returns to scale
derived from banksexpertise; and competition. The rst enables bigger banks to
survive competition better, have higher asset-quality, and be more leveraged. It
drives banks into a race for expansion. This race toughens competition between
banks, which edges out small banks and may deteriorate all banksasset quality.
Consequently, the banking industry will be dominated by a small number of highly
leveraged banks. In this paper, nancial intermediation arises endogenously and
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nance.
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Why is the banking industry dominated by a few too big to fail institutions? As
a step towards answering the question, this paper considers the economic implications
of bank size, which, unlike bank capitalization, receives little attention in the academic
literature. Specically, the paper examines the causal e¤ects of bank size on banks
survival in a competitive market and on their asset quality. Based on these e¤ects, the
paper also considers how size a¤ects bankschoice of leverage.
This paper characterizes the banking industry with two assumptions. First, banks
have an advantage over the general public (households) in identifying which investment
projects of entrepreneurs are protable. In this paper, while households have no way to
evaluate projects, banks can attain expertise to evaluate and screen them. Therefore,
households invest in a project only if some bank certies to them that it nds this project
protable. Second, banks can provide this certication not by words of mouth, but by
investing a su¢ cient quantity of their own funds in the projects. Thus, informed funds 
namely, those provided by banks earn a higher rate of return than uninformed funds 
namely, those of households.
These two assumptions imply that the banking industry has increasing returns to scale,
which is consistent with the industrys long-term trend of increasing concentration.1 If
a bank has attained a certain level of screening expertise, it can apply this expertise to
the deployment of all its funds. Thus, all its funds earn the return of informed funds.
The more funds a bank has, the bigger prot it earns from its screening expertise, which
induces the bank to attain a higher level of the expertise. Increasing returns to scale
may, in general, result from any sort of expertise because the acquisition of expertise is
in the nature of xed costs. For example, learning a widely spoken language delivers
1This trend is well documented in the empirical literature; see, amongst others, Berger, Kashyap and
Scalise (1995) (for US over 1979-1994), Saunders and Wilson (1999) (gures 2 and 3, for Canada and
UK over 1893-1991), Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) (for US over 1988-1997), Jones and Critcheld
(2005) (for US over 1984-2003).
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bigger benets than learning a narrowly spoken one; and becoming a top comedian is
more protable where the potential audience is larger.2 To exploit the increasing returns
to scale, banks all want to expand. Then, competition becomes ercer. The larger the
quantity of informed funds banks supply, the lower the return rates these funds earn.
Consequently, banks all gain less from screening expertise and thus attain less of it.
The two forces, increasing returns to scale and competition, are in conict. Together
they shape the implications of bankssizes for their survival, asset quality, and leverage,
and drive the banking industry to be dominated by a small number of highly leveraged
banks.
First, a bank can survive competition only if its size is above a threshold, and this
threshold is higher when bank nance is more abundant. This result is consistent with
the previously mentioned trend of increasing concentration: the pressure to survive drives
banks all to expand, which raises the survival threshold, edging smaller banks out.
Second, if all banks are enlarged, but their shares of the loan market remain fairly
stable, then their screening expertise declines and their asset quality falls. This is because,
for a bank whose market share is not much increased, the negative e¤ects of competition
dominate the positive e¤ects of increasing returns to scale. What banks sell to entrepre-
neurs, essentially, is certication service rather than nancing, because households have
abundant funds. If a bank cannot sell the service to more entrepreneurs, the scale of its
business is not enlarged and the force of increasing returns to scale not unleashed.
Third, there is a complementarity between leverage and screening expertise. On the
one hand, the higher a banks level of screening expertise, the greater its leverage. On
the other hand, the greater leverage enlarges the scale of its funds more, which, due to
increasing returns to scale, induces the bank to attain a higher level of screening expertise.
2Williamson (1986b), Carter and Manaster (1990), and Hauswald and Marquez (2006) consider similar
cases of increasing returns to application scale, but not in relation to bank size.
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Hence, bigger banks have better screening expertise and are more leveraged. This result
is consistent with a trend of growing leverage in the banking industry: with small banks
continuously edged out, the remaining banks become bigger and bigger, and, thus, the
industry-wide leverage gets higher and higher.3
In this paper, nancial intermediation arises naturally and coexists with direct nance.
Screening expertise earns banks the informed fundsrate on the asset side, while they bor-
row from households at the uninformed fundsrate on the liability side. The di¤erence in
rates is the prot margin of nancial intermediation. Besides investing in banks, house-
holds invest directly in projects that receive bank funding as the bank funding certies
their quality. In this paper, the allocation of householdsfunds between the intermediated
and direct nance channels is uniquely determined. The nancial intermediation a¤ects
the equilibrium outcome by expanding the pool of informed funds.4
The paper shows that a universal increase in bankssizes may cause their asset qualities
to decline. It is thus related to the literature that explains why loose lending standards
are associated with lending booms; see Rajan (1994), Ruckers (2004), and DellAriccia
and Marquez (2006). A di¤erence is that, in the present paper, an increase in size drives
a fall in quality, whereas in that literature, both are driven by some other factor, such as
bank managerscareer concern in Rajan (1994), the distribution of borrowersquality in
Ruckers (2004), or the distribution of information in DellAriccia and Marquez (2006).
In this paper, nancial intermediation arises endogenously as banks want to enlarge
their scales to exploit the increasing returns to scale. This is related to the literature that
3See Section 5 for a detailed discussion of empirical implications and the relevant empirical studies.
4In papers by Besanko and Kanatas (1993) and Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), entrepreneurs (rms)
receive funds from both households and banks, as in the present paper. However, Besanko and Kanatas
do not consider nancial intermediation (i.e., banks drawing funds from households). While Holmstrom
and Tirole include nancial intermediation, they nd that it does not a¤ect the equilibrium outcome and
that the allocation of funds between it and direct nance is indeterminate.
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endogenizes nancial intermediation with delegated monitoring and increasing returns to
scale regarding the incentive costs of monitoring the bank.5 The source of the increasing
returns to scale is di¤erent: In this paper they are due to a general feature of expertise
as mentioned above, while in that literature they are due to cross insurance. Moreover,
direct nance and intermediated nance coexist in this paper, while not in that literature.
This paper nds bigger banks able to grow faster, implying a trend of increasing
dominance, which is extensively examined in industrial economics; see Flaherty (1980),
Gilbert and Newbery (1982), Budd, Harris and Vickers (1993), and, recently, Cabral
(2011) and Besanko et al. (2011). Using the terminology of industrial economics, banks
here engage in (di¤erentiated product) Bertrand competition with limited capacity à la
Kreps and Scheinkman (1983).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 sets up the basic model in
which banks invest only their own funds. This model is analyzed in section 2 and extended
in section 3 to encompass bank leverage. Section 4 lays out empirical implications, while
section 5 discusses a modeling choice. Section 6 concludes. All proofs are relegated to the
appendix.
1 Basic Model
The economy lasts for two dates (numbered 1 and 2) with no discounting and is populated
by many small households, a continuum of [0; 1] of banks, and a continuum of [0; 1] 
[0; 1] entrepreneurs. Banks are in perfect competition,6 and each serves a continuum
of entrepreneurs. All agents are risk neutral and protected by limited liability. Each
entrepreneur has a project, while banks and households have funds.
5See Diamond (1984), Gale and Hellwig (1985), Williamson (1986a), Krasa and Villamil (1992),
Winton (1995), and Cantillo (2004), among others, and see Gorton and Winton (2003) for a survey.
6The case of oligopolistic banks will be briey discussed in section 6.
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Funds are invested at date 1 either in projects or in a risk-free asset for which the gross
rate of return is 1. A project requires an investment of $B and may succeed, yielding
$Z, or fail, yielding 0.7 The probability of success is q for high-type projects and q < q
for low types. The fraction of high types is n and that of low types is n = 1   n. We
assume that
qZ  B > 0 > (nq + n q)Z  B: (1)
That is, a high-type project has positive social value, but a randomly selected one does
not.
Each bank j 2 [0; 1] has Kj units of funds, which captures the banks size. The unit
is so dened that out of 1 unit of funds, $1 can be invested in each of a continuum
of mass 1 of projects. Without loss of generality, we assume Kj is a continuous, non-
increasing function of j. In the basic model, banks are assumed to invest only their own
funds, while bank borrowing will be incorporated in Section 3.
Households are small, but overall, their funds are so abundant that not all of these
funds can be invested in entrepreneursprojects. The remainder ows to the risk-free
asset. It follows that households are satised with a gross rate of return 1.
Households know the prior distribution of the types of projects, but have no way of
evaluating and screening them. However, banks can attain expertise in evaluating and
screening projects. By assumption (1), only the high-type projects yield a surplus, so
that the banksscreening services create a social value.
1.1 BanksScreening Expertise
By spending C(p), a bank acquires screening expertise of accuracy p 2 [0; 1]. With the
expertise of this accuracy, for each project it screens, the bank receives an independent
7If projects yield a return of Z 0 2 (0; B) in the event of failure, then entrepreneurs can borrow up to
Z 0 in a risk-free manner, which will not change the papers results.
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signal es = g(ood) or b(ad) about the projects type according to
Pr(es = gjeq = q) = 1; Pr(es = bjeq = q) = p; Pr(es = gjeq = q) = 1  p; (2)
where eq is the true probability of success of the project. That is, high-type projects obtain
a good evaluation with certainty, while low types receive a bad evaluation with probability
p:8 We call projects that obtain a good evaluation good projects and those that receive a
bad evaluation bad projects.
To focus the analysis on banks, we assume that an entrepreneur does not know the type
of his project before a bank evaluates it, and that he observes the result of the banks
evaluation. Households never observe this evaluation. Moreover, we assume that the
screening accuracy of any bank is publicly observed, so the only information asymmetry
between banks and entrepreneurs on the one hand, and households on the other, is over
the evaluations of projects.
The cost function C() is convex over [0; 1] and satises C 00() > 0, C(0) = C 0(0) = 0
and C 0(1) = 1: Furthermore, C 0(p) = o( 1
(1 p)2 ) around p = 1;
9 which ensures that the
cost does not grow too fast in p.
Let qg(p) denote the posterior probability of success for a good project, qb(p) the
posterior probability of success for a bad project, and ng(p) the probability of obtaining
a good evaluation.10 Then, Vg(p) := qg(p)Z   B is the social value of a good project;
S(p) := ng(p)Vg(p) is the ex ante social surplus of a project if it is nanced only when
it obtains a good evaluation; and d(p) := qg(p)=qb(p) measures the di¤erence in quality
8Note that C(p) is the cost of obtaining screening expertise of accuracy p, not that of evaluating a
single project to this accuracy. That is, once a bank has paid C(p), it can evaluates all projects at
accuracy p. Allowing the accuracy of evaluating one project to depend on the resources spent for this
particular evaluation would not qualitatively change the papers results.
9That is, C 0(p)(1  p)2 ! 0 if p! 1:
10With (2), qg(p) =
nq+n(1 p)q
n+n(1 p) , qb(p) = q, and ng(p) = n+ n(1  p):
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between good and bad projects. It is straightforward to show that
q0g(p) > 0; d
0(p) > 0; d(p) > 1 for p > 0; S 0(p) > 0; and S 00(p)  0 : (3)
These properties are all that is required for the analysis in this paper; the specic modeling
of screening accuracy (2) is adopted for its simplicity.
Let p be the critical level of accuracy at which the social surplus of a good project
just reaches 0, namely, Vg(p) = 0. Then, 0 < p < 1 and a good project has a positive
social value if and only if p > p:11 If the accuracy of evaluation is below p, then even
projects evaluated as being good are not nanced and screening service of this accuracy is
useless. A bank, if not choosing accuracy above p; chooses p = 0. If a bank chooses so and
thus to be uninformed, then it is identical to a household in making investments. We say
that such a bank is edged out of the banking industry. If a bank opts to be informed by
choosing some p > p, we say that this bank stays in business and survives competition. We
call funds provided by informed banks informed funds and funds provided by households
(and uninformed banks) uninformed funds.
As for how banks can credibly communicate their evaluations of the projects to house-
holds, we make two assumptions.
Assumption 1: Banksannouncements of their evaluations of projects are not cred-
ible.
This assumption means that to certify good evaluations to households, banks must
put their money where their mouth is.A contract between an entrepreneur and a bank
must involve the investment of the banks funds. Such a contract is characterized by a
pair (I; F ), where I is the amount invested by the bank in the project and F is the face
rate of return, or, simply, the face rate, of this investment so that I  F is the amount to
11This follows from the fact that V 0g(p) = q
0
gZ > 0, Vg(0) = (nq+n q)Z B < 0; and Vg(1) = qZ B > 0
by the assumption in (1).
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be repaid to the bank when the project succeeds; when it fails, by limited liability, no
party gets anything.
Assumption 2: For a contract (I; F ), the amount of investment, I; is observable to
households, but the face rate, F; is not.
We justify this assumption on two grounds. First, in real life, the amount of investment
is usually publicized or reported in the media, but the terms of the investment, which F
represents, are not. Second, even if the terms are publicized, they are not a reliable guide
to the actual rate of return, because the entrepreneur could easily sign another contract
with the bank (for example, for consulting services) to arrange a side payment to the
bank, and it would be too costly for households to check all the contracts between the
two.
Because of these two assumptions, in order to credibly certify a projects quality,
the bank needs to invest enough of its own funds, as will be shown. This ties banks
certication service, which is what they essentially sell to entrepreneurs, to the investment
of their own funds. Then, bank size matters: the more funds a bank has, the more
entrepreneurs it sells the certication service to, and, thus, the more prots it earns. This
is how the paper endogenizes increasing returns to scale in the banking sector.
After an entrepreneur secures $I of funds from an informed bank, he goes to the
market for the funds of households. Households observe I; and based on it, infer the
quality of the project. Projects that receive no bank funding are of lower-than-average
quality, therefore do not attract household funding; their entrepreneurs withdraw from
the market.
1.2 Timing of Events and Information Structure
The timing of events at date 1 is as below.
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Stage 1: For each j 2 [0; 1], bank j posts (pj; Rj) namely, the screening accuracy it
attains and the expected rate of return it commits to charge for its funds.
Stage 2: Entrepreneurs each go to one informed bank and get their projects evaluated.
The evaluation of a project is observed by the entrepreneur and the bank, but not by
households. Based on the evaluations, the entrepreneurs submit a request for the banks
funds. If the bank has attracted too many entrepreneurs and the total demand for its
funds is above its funding capacity, then rationing happens and only a fraction of the
entrepreneurs get their requests satised. These entrepreneurs then sign a contract (I; F )
with the bank, where I is observed by households. Afterwards, entrepreneurs seek funds
from households. If they manage to acquire $B altogether, they start their projects.
At date 2, the returns of the projects are realized and distributed to investors according
to the contracts signed at date 1.
2 Size, Survival and Asset Quality
In order to nd the subgame perfect equilibrium, we analyze the decisions in the following
order. First, given (p;R) o¤ered by a bank, the entrepreneurs coming to it decides their
demand for the banks funds, contingent on the evaluations of their projects. Second,
given all bankso¤ers, fpj; Rjgj2[0;1]; each entrepreneur decides to which bank he goes.
Third, anticipating these decisions by entrepreneurs, banks decide on (p;R):
2.1 EntrepreneursDecisions
No entrepreneurs would come to an uninformed bank, whose funds serve no certication
purposes. Consider the entrepreneurs who have come to an informed bank of size K that
o¤ers (p;R), with p > p and R > 1:12 Then, the demand for the banks funds by those
12As noted earlier, informed banks choose p > p. Also, no informed bank posts R  1, a return rate
no higher than that of uninformed funds.
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whose projects receive a good evaluation, henceforth called good entrepreneurs, is
I(p;R) =
Vg(p)
Rd(p)  1 ; (4)
and the demand by bad entrepreneurs, namely those whose projects receive a bad evalu-
ation, is 0.
This result is driven by two considerations. First, any demand of I  I(p;R) of the
banks funds certies the entrepreneur has received a good evaluation. Consider a bad
entrepreneur who mimics a good one by demanding the same amount of bank funding.
The bank, assessing the probability of success as qb, charges him a face rate of R=qb and
demands a repayment of I R=qb when his project succeeds. If this investment I convinces
households that the project is good, they are willing to nance the shortfall, B   I; at
face rate 1=qg; 13 for a face value of (B   I)=qg. If Vm := Z   I  R=qb   (B   I)=qg < 0,
the projects revenue in the case of success, Z; is insu¢ cient to cover the liability outlay,
I  R=qb + (B   I)=qg. Then, the bank expects not to be fully repaid with I  R=qb; and
therefore declines to lend I to the bad entrepreneur. Hence bank funding certies only
good evaluations if Vm < 0; or equivalently I  I(p;R). Second, because bank funding
is more costly than household funding, as R > 1, a good entrepreneur demands only the
minimum bank funding necessary to certify the quality of his project namely, I(p;R) 
and nances the shortfall with the cheaper household funding.
Consider now the aggregation of the individual demands for the banks funds. Given
an entrepreneur receives a good evaluation with probability ng(p) and the evaluations
come independently, by the Law of Large Number, the total demand by one unit of





units of entrepreneurs. IfM > (p;R) units of entrepreneurs come to the bank, rationing
13So the expected rate of return is qg  1=qg = 1; which satises households.
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happens, and each entrepreneur is served with probability l = (p;R)=M: Otherwise, all






Conditional on being served, an entrepreneur obtains the di¤erence of the social
surplus of his project, S(p); minus the prot surrendered to the bank. This prot
equals ng(p)I(p;R)(R   1) because the expected demand by him for the banks funds
is ng(p)I(p;R) and each pound of them earns the bank a net prot of R 1:With I(p;R)
given by (4) and S(p) = ng(p)Vg(p); the expected payo¤ of a served entrepreneur is
(p;R) = S(p)
(d(p)  1)R
d(p)R  1 : (7)
Now, consider entrepreneursdecisions on which banks to borrow from, given all banks
deals, fpj; Rjgj2[0;1]: All the banks that attract entrepreneurs to come o¤er an incoming
entrepreneur the same expected payo¤, b, because no entrepreneurs would go to a bank
that o¤ers less if they can get b from some other banks. Therefore, if a bank o¤ering
(p;R) attracts M > 0 units of entrepreneurs, then
l  (p;R) = b; (8)
where l is given by (6). The allocation of entrepreneurs to banks, fMjgj2[0;1]; and b are
determined by (8) and the following market-clearing condition:Z
j2[0;1]
Mj = 1: (9)
2.2 BanksDecisions: Increasing Returns to Scale and Compe-
tition
Having examined entrepreneursdecisions, we move on to nd the best response of a bank
given the choices of (p;R) by all the other banks. Given there is a continuum of banks,
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each bank has only a negligible e¤ect on b; so each bank takes b as given when choosing
(p;R). Given b; a bank can choose to be uninformed and thereby get 0 economic prot. If
it chooses to be informed, it has to ensure that its o¤er, (p;R); can attract entrepreneurs,
i.e., that (p;R)  b by (8). The bank has no incentives to make (p;R) > b and
induce excess demand.14 Therefore, at the optimum, (p;R) = b; which, together with
(7), implies that after attaining accuracy p; the bank charges the following interest rate:
R(p; b) = b
d(p)b  (d(p)  1)S(p) : (10)
Neither does the bank induce under-demand.15 It follows that if a bank of size K chooses
to be informed at accuracy p, all its funds are lent out at return rate R(p; b); and its
value is
K  (R(p; b)  1)  C(p): (11)
The banks decision problem is to nd a p 2 [0; 1] to maximize this value, taking b
as given. Let (K; b) be the optimal p and (K; b) the optimal value of this decision
problem. Then, the bank chooses to be informed only if (K; b)  0; and if it does so,
it picks
p = (K; b) (12)
R = R((K; b); b); (13)
where R(p; b) is given by (10). Since the bank induces neither excess-demand nor under-
demand, it receives the following number (units) of entrepreneurs and serves them all:
(K; b) := ((K; b); R((K; b); b)); (14)
where (p;R) is given by (5).
14Otherwise, it would increase the interest rate, R, which decreases (p;R); and lend all its funds out
at this increased rate.
15If the bank has only part of its funds earn return rate R(p; b); it would lower the rate a little to
R  "; which induces over-demand, as (p;R  ") > b; so all its funds earn return rate R  ":
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The lemma below establishes a lower bound for the equilibrium payo¤of entrepreneurs.
Lemma 1 If b  d(1) 1
d(1)
S(1); then (K; b) =1 for any K > 0:
The lower bound for b exists because of competition between banks. If b were below
the bound, then a particular bank would undercut all the other banks and obtain a big
prot by providing a screening service of such accuracy p that the payo¤ to entrepreneurs,
(p;R); is above b; namely, what they can obtain elsewhere, for even R ! 1: By
this lemma, any function of b; such as (K; b); is meaningfully dened only for for
b > (d(1)   1)S(1)=d(1); which, therefore, is a precondition for any proposition below
where b is taken as given.
Now we can explain the two forces that shape the economic implications of bank size:
increasing returns to scale and competition. Each force presents itself at both prot and
marginal prot levels. These two forces, at these two levels, are formalized as follows.
Proposition 1 For (K; b) at which 1 > (K; b) > 0 (namely, the bank chooses to be
informed),
(i) @=@K > 0; @2=@K2 > 0; and @=@K > 0;
(ii) @=@b < 0; and @=@b < 0:
Result (i) is concerned with increasing returns to scale at the two levels. First, at the
level of bank prot, we have @=@K > 0; that is, bigger banks get higher value from being
informed. A bigger capacity benets informed banks by raising both extensive margin
and prot (or intensive) margin. A bank becomes informed only if doing so enables it to
charge R > 1 for its funds; thus, the more funds a bank deploys, the higher prot it earns
on becoming informed. Also, the bigger the bank, the higher the prot margin, because
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by (10), R increases with the screening accuracy,16 which, as @=@K > 0; increases with
size.
Second, increasing returns to scale at the level of marginal prot drive @=@K > 0;
that is, bigger banks choose higher screening accuracy. The choice of screening accuracy,
(K; b); which maximizes (11), satises the following rst order condition for p:
Kb(d(p)  1)S 0(p) + d0(p)(S(p)  b)
[d(p)b  (d(p)  1)S(p)]2 = C 0(p): (15)
The marginal prot from higher accuracy, which appears on the left-hand side of the
equation, is proportional to the size, K. Intuitively, screening expertise of higher accuracy
enables the bank to charge a higher interest rate, which augments the banks prot farther
if the bank is larger.
From @=@K > 0 it follows that the larger the bank, the bigger the marginal value
of size (i.e. @=@K), because by the envelope theorem @=@K = R((K; b); b)  1 and
thus @2=@K2 = R0p  @=@K > 0:
Result (ii) is concerned with two e¤ects of competition, where competition is repre-
sented by b; the payo¤ a bank has to give entrepreneurs for attracting them to come.
First, at the level of prot, we have @=@b < 0; that is, ercer competition lowers banks
prot. This is because it forces banks to surrender more payo¤ to entrepreneurs and,
thus, to obtain less from the certication service.
Second, we have @=@b < 0; that is, ercer competition drives banks to lower screening
accuracy. It does so by squeezing the marginal prot to banks from an accuracy increment,
which both widens the prot margin and enlarges the business scale. Screening of higher
accuracy increases the social value of a project, S(p); and thereby widens the prot
margin from each project screened, S(p)   b: The total marginal prot so generated
16Note that  [d(p)b  (d(p)  1)S(p)]0p = (d  1)S0+d0(S  b); which is positive because d > 1; d0 > 0
and S0 > 0 by (3), and S   b; the surplus the bank gets from each project evaluated, is positive if the
bank chooses to be informed.
15
is proportional to the number of projects screened, which decreases with b: the higher
the payo¤ to the entrepreneurs (b); the lower the rate charged (R); and the more the
banks funds demanded by each good entrepreneur for certication (I 0R < 0 by 4), and
the fewer the entrepreneurs served. Also, higher accuracy enables the bank to serve more
entrepreneurs because entrepreneurs, when more accurately evaluated as being good, need
less of the banks funds for certication (I 0p < 0 by 4). The gain to the bank from the added
entrepreneurs is proportional to the prot margin, S(p)   b; which obviously decreases
with b: Therefore, a higher b diminishes the marginal prot of an accuracy increment to
banks in both dimensions.
The increasing returns to scale imply that only big banks survive competition, as
stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Let K(b) be the largest root of (K; b) = 0.
(i): K(b) exists and is strictly positive, and (K; b) > 0 if and only if K > K:
(ii): K 0(b) > 0:
Result (i) says that a bank survives competition (i.e.,   0) only if its size is above
a threshold (i.e., K  K), while smaller banks are edged out. Result (ii) says that when
competition becomes ercer (i.e., a larger b), the threshold of survival rises. This is
because the more payo¤ needed to give entrepreneurs, the less a bank gets from serving
one entrepreneur on becoming informed; in order to cover the cost of attaining screening
expertise, therefore, the more entrepreneurs it needs to serve, which requires a larger
funding capacity.
The two results together suggest that the banking industry is subject to a trend
of increasing concentration.17 The pressure to survive and the motive to exploit the
increasing returns to scale drive banks into a race for expansion, which raises b (as we
17For supportive empirical evidence, see the empirical studies cited in footnote 1.
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will show), so that all banks face even ercer competition. Moreover, if the extent of
expansion is proportion to the marginal value of size, namely to @=@K; then result
@2=@K2 > 0 (Proposition 1.i) suggests that smaller banks are able to expand less, thus
losing out in the race. Altogether, smaller banks are continuously edged out, leaving the
banking industry more and more concentrated.
Having examined the decisions of entrepreneurs and banks, we now proceed to dene
the equilibrium formally and examine its existence and properties.
2.3 Equilibrium
Banks choose to be informed if the value from doing so, ; is nonnegative, which, by
Proposition 2, is the case if and only if K  K(b): As we assume Kj to be non-increasing
in j, it follows that there is a threshold t 2 [0; 1]; such that bank j chooses to be informed
if and only if j  t: There are two cases for the value of t. One, t = 1; namely, all banks
become informed; in this case K1  K(b): The other, t < 1; namely, smaller banks are
edged out; in this case, Kt = K(b); because Kj is assumed continuous in j: Note that in
the latter case, there may be a; b 2 (0; 1) such that a < t < b and Ka = Kb = K; that
is, the marginal banks, which are of size K; play a mixed strategy, some of them being
informed, the rest uninformed.
As banksdecisions on whether to be informed are summarized by variable t and each
of them takes b as given, an equilibrium is thus represented by a pair of (t; b), dened
as follows.
Denition 1 A pair of (t; b) is an equilibrium if
(i) Given b;
Kt = K(b) if t < 1 or K1  K(b) if t = 1; (16)
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(ii) the market clears: Z t
0
(Kj; b)dj = 1:18 (17)
Condition (17) is derived from (9) and the fact that no banks induce excess demand
or under-demand. Once (t; b) is pinned down, the equilibrium decisions of banks and
entrepreneurs follow straightforwardly. Bank j chooses to be informed if and only if j  t;
informed banks choose (p;R) as given by (12) and (13); (K; b) (given by 14) units of
entrepreneurs go to an informed bank of size K and demand I(p;R) (given by 4) of its
funding when their projects receive a good evaluation and demand nothing otherwise.
The equilibrium market share of bank j is thus:
bj = (Kj; b) if j  t0 if j > t

:
Proposition 3 A unique equilibrium exists and has the following properties.
(i) If a positive measure of informed banks increase their sizes, then the payo¤ of entre-
preneurs (b) increases, and all the other informed banks lower their screening accuracies
and interest rates.
(ii) If all banks increase size without changing their market shares, fbjgj2[0;1]; then
they all lower screening accuracy and interest rate.
Result (i) says that expansion by some banks toughens competition (i.e., b higher)
and weakens their competitors, who consequently lower the quality of their screening
expertise and the price of their funds. The expanded banks face the same negative e¤ects
of competition, but are blessed by the increasing returns to scale, which enable them to
choose greater screening accuracy (i.e., @=@K > 0) and thereby charge a higher price.
For an enlarged bank, these positive e¤ects dominates the negative e¤ects if it expands
18As will be shown in the proof of Proposition 3, @=@K > 0; that is, (Kj ; b) is non-increasing with
j: Thus as a function of j, (Kj ; b) is integrable.
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far more than all the other expanding banks, in which case its expansion not only weakens
the competitors, but also strengthens itself. Therefore, not only do banks want to expand,
but also they want to expand far more than all the others.
Result (ii) gives one condition under which this race for expansion weakens all the
banks: it adds no market share to any bank. For an intuition, note that expansion always
toughens competition, which tends to decrease the prot margin of providing certication
service for all banks. If this decrease in prot margin is not compensated by an increase
in business scale namely, if banks cannot sell certication service to more entrepreneurs
banks gain less from screening expertise, and therefore attain the less of it.
With all banksscreening expertise weakened, the default risks of their assets rise.19
Note that banks still invest only in projects evaluated as good, but with the evaluations
becoming less accurate, the composition of these projects gets worse: a smaller fraction
of them are high types, a bigger one low types.
2.4 Welfare Properties of the Equilibrium
The equilibrium is ex post e¢ cient, because all the good projects are nanced and none
of the bad ones is. As for ex ante e¢ ciency, we dene the rst-best allocation as the
choice of the social planner if she can allocate entrepreneurs to banks and pick a level of
accuracy for each bank, and the second-best allocation as the planners choice if she has
to respect the equilibrium market shares of banks, but picks screening accuracy for each
informed bank. The rst best allocation is more e¢ cient than the second best one, which,
we show below, is more e¢ cient than the equilibrium allocation.
Suppose the planner chooses accuracy p for bank j. Then the banks service generates
a social value of S(p) from each of the bj units of entrepreneurs whom it serves in equi-
19Mathematically, the default probability of the projects bank j invests is 1   qg(pj), which increases
when pj decreases, because q0g() > 0.
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librium. Overall, thus, the bank generates a social value of bj S(p); while the social cost




The second-best choice of quality, denoted by pj ; satises the following rst order
condition:
bjS 0(p) = C 0(p): (18)
Proposition 4 For any informed bank j; bpj > pj : That is, compared to the second-best
allocation, banks overspend on screening expertise.
For an intuition, refer back to the discussion of why @=@b < 0 (see Proposition 1.ii).
There we show that for a bank, higher screening quality generates two benets, one from
more entrepreneurs to be served, the other from a widened prot margin S(p)   b: As
(S(p)  b)0 = S 0(p); the latter benet accrues equally to the social planner. However, the
former benet does not accrue to the social planner because the planner takes as given
the number of entrepreneurs allocated to each bank. It is the motive of attracting more
entrepreneur with higher screening quality that drives banks to overspend on screening
expertise.
Essential to the proposition is the models feature that banksfunds serve mainly cer-
tication purposes and the investments of the projects are mainly nanced by households.
Should the household sector be absent, an entrepreneurs demand for the banks funds
would be xed at B; the investment need. The bank would serve K=B units of entrepre-
neurs, independent of its screening quality. Improved screening quality would not bring
more entrepreneurs to the bank, therefore, the overspending result would not arise.
For an implication of this result, consider where the resources are spent to attain or
improve screening expertise. A fraction of the resources might be spent on IT infrastruc-
ture. But for the banking sector, probably a bigger fraction is spent in attracting human
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capital with high salaries and/or bonuses. For example, over 20052010, the average ratio
of compensation and benets to overall non-interest expenses was 65% for Goldman Sachs
and 64% for Morgan Stanley,20 while, in contrast, this ratio for U.S. manufacturing sector
is 11%.21 Moreover, from an economics point of view, these payments of compensation
and benets may work more as a xed cost than as a marginal cost because it seems that
very often they are outlaid independently of the banksperformance rather than anchored
to it.22 If we accept that a big fraction of C(p) is thus spent, then the proposition suggests
that the banking industry indeed hands out excessive payments, and a policy to cap them
could improve ex ante e¢ ciency.
The next section extends the model to encompass bank leverage, whereby we show
that there is a complementarity between leverage and screening quality.
3 Bank Leverage
In the analysis thus far, banks do not borrow from households; rather, they invest only
their own funds. In this section, we assume that before banks choose screening accuracy,
they can borrow funds from households, while using their own funds as the equity.23 The
investing households, as debt-holders, are repaid prior to the banks, the equity holders.
Banksadvantage over households in screening expertise drives banks to borrow. It
20Calculated from the annual reports of the two banks published on their websites.
21See "The misery of manufacturing," The Economist, pages 75-76, 27/09 - 03/10, 2003.
22For example, for year 2008, Citigroup and Merrill Lynch both paid their employees each a bonus of
one million or more dollars, although the banks su¤ered a huge loss; see Million-dollar bonus breakdown
to reignite US bank controversy(Financial Times, 31/07/2009). Banks often resort to the need to retain
key human capital, rather than that to provide incentives, when coming to justify high bonuses.
23The paper assumes banks do not issue outside equities to households, possibly due to some friction
of costly state verication in the manner of Townsend (1979), Diamond (1984), and Gale and Hellwig
(1985).
21
enables them to earn the rate of informed funds on the asset side, while they repay the
rate of uninformed funds to households on the liability side, the gap between these two
rates producing the prot margin of borrowing. Individual banks take this prot margin
as given, and so long as it is positive, they want to borrow as much as possible. To limit
their borrowing, we introduce risk-shifting problems in the manner of Jensen and Meckling
(1976). This requires the risks of the projects to be correlated,24 while the analysis so far
is independent of such correlation. To simplify the exposition, we assume that the risks
of projects are perfectly correlated. Specically, foreseen at date 1, at date 2 the economy
is in one of three possible states, f; 1; 2g, occurring with probability 1  q, q   q, and q,
respectively. In state , no projects succeed; in state 1, only high-type projects succeed
and low types fail; and in state 2, both types succeed. So high-type projects succeed in
both states 1 and 2, thus with probability q; and low types succeed in state 2 only, thus
with probability q:
3.1 The Risk-Shifting Problem and Leverage Ratio
Suppose a bank borrows D units of funds from households at face rate f , so that its
liability is Df . The risk-shifting problem of the bank is that if D is too large, the bank
may want to invest in bad projects at a lower expected return rate but a higher face rate
than it obtains by investing in good projects.
Let F be the face rate of investing in good projects, that is, F = R=qg; and F 0 be
that of investing in bad projects, which succeed with probability qb: The value of F 0 lies
between F and F  qg=qb. On the one hand, the bank rejects any face rate below F .
On the other hand, bad entrepreneurs cannot a¤ord a face rate above F  qg=qb; namely
an expected rate of return above R, by the argument leading to (4). Then, for some
24Otherwise, as each bank nances a continuum of projects, the risks on its asset side will be completely
diversied away and no risk-shifting problems will arise.
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 2 (0; 1);
F 0 = ((1  )qg
qb
+ )F: (19)
Note that qbF 0 < qgF; but F 0 > F; that is, weighted against the risk, the investment in
bad projects is worse than that in good projects, but contingent on success, the former
delivers a higher return than the latter does. This hallmarks a typical circumstance liable
to risk-shifting problems. To prevent them, the leverage ratio, L := D=K; should be
capped, as the following lemma shows.
Lemma 2 If a bank with K units of equity funds borrows D at face rate f , attains
accuracy p, and charges return rate R, then it does not invest in bad projects if and only









If the inequality holds, the bank repays its debt with probability q and
f = 1=q: (21)
The bank repays its debt with probability q because it does so whenever high-type
projects succeed, which is in turn because the debt claims are senior to the equity claim
held by the bank. The debt holders earn an expected rate of return of qf and are satised
with a return rate of 1. Hence (21) holds.
3.2 Complementarity between Leverage and Screening Accuracy
In this subsection we nd the equilibrium leverage of banks and show a complementarity
between leverage and screening accuracy. Banks, taking the prot margin of borrowing
as given, want to borrow as much as they can fend o¤ the risk-shifting problems. They
are thus leveraged to the upper bound given by (20). With f given by (21) and R as a
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(q   q)=q   (1  1
d(pj)
)R(pj; b) : (22)
This equation describes how the leverage ratio of a bank depends on its screening accu-
racy.25
Furthermore, leverage feeds back to screening accuracy. If bank j is leveraged at ratio
Lj; then its screening accuracy is given by
pj(Lj) = (Kj(1 + Lj); b): (23)
That is, in determining the choice of screening accuracy, debt-nanced funds, D = K L;
play an equal role as the equity funds, K. This is because borrowed funds and equity
funds contribute in equal terms to the marginal value of higher accuracy, for which an
intuition is as follows. By the preceding lemma, the probability of debt being repaid,
xed at q; is independent of the accuracy choice, p. Hence, so is the marginal cost of debt
(D), as is the marginal cost of equity (K). Moreover, debt and equity contribute in equal
terms to a banks revenue at given p (i.e. (K +D)R(p)) and thus to its marginal revenue
(i.e. (K + D)R0p): Therefore, D and K contribute in equal terms to both the marginal
benet and the marginal cost of higher p.
Equations (22) and (23) together yield the following.
Proposition 5 There is a complementarity between screening accuracy and leverage: for
any bank j, L0j(pj) > 0 and p
0
j(Lj) > 0: That is, on the one hand, a bank with more-
accurate screening expertise is leveraged at a higher ratio; on the other hand, higher
leverage leads to greater accuracy.
25Or, rather the rational expectation of the accuracy, as the leverage choice is decided before the
accuracy choice.
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Intuitively, that L0j(pj) > 0 because the greater the screening accuracy p, the starker
the di¤erence in quality between good and bad projects (i.e. d) and the higher the rate
charged (because R0p > 0): Both lead to bigger value destruction by risk shifting (as
R  qbF 0 = (1  1=d)R by 19), thus inducing smaller incentives to do that, which allows
for higher leverage. That p0j(Lj) > 0 because higher leverage augments the banks size
farther, which, due to the increasing returns to scale at the level of marginal prot, induces
the bank to attain greater accuracy.
The next section presents empirical implications of the paper.
4 Empirical Implications
A. Bigger banks are leveraged at higher ratios: the bigger the bank, the higher the screen-
ing accuracy due to increasing returns to scale, and, by the complementarity, the higher
the leverage.26 We show in Proposition 1 @2=@K2 > 0; which suggests bigger banks able
to enlarge their equity (i.e. K) farther if the extent of equity enlargement increases with
the marginal value of equity, @=@K: Together with implication A, therefore, the paper
suggests that bigger banks can expand more, both by enlarging equity farther and by being
leveraged higher. This suggests a trend of increasing dominance in the banking industry.
Implication A is consistent with many empirical ndings. Liang and Rhoades (1991),
with a sample of 4751 US banking rms over 197986, report on Table II that the total
asset (TA) negatively and signicantly a¤ects the equity/asset ratio (E/A). Akhavein et al.
(1997), analyzing big U.S. banks over 19801990, nd that after merger and acquisitions
(M&A), consolidated banks widen the negative di¤erence in E/A from their peer banks by
6 basis points. Demsetz and Strahan (1997), examining large U.S. bank holding companies
(BHC) over 19801993, document in Table 3 a strong, signicant, and negative correlation
26Mathematically, if Ai := Ki+Di > Aj := Kj +Dj , then by (23) and @=@K > 0; pi > pj ; and hence
Li > Lj since L0(p) > 0.
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between size and E/A. This strong negative correlation is also found, more recently, by
Lepetit et al. (2008) for a set of European banks over 19962002 and by Haq and Heaney
(2012) for 117 European nancial institutions over 19962010.
While this empirical literature often attributes the higher leverage of bigger banks
to the benets of diversication, the present paper nds it may come, orthogonal to
diversication, from the complementarity between leverage and screening expertise. The
two arguments diverge in the link between the size of a bank and the quality of its
individual loans. No link is implied by the diversication argument, while this paper
implies the following.
B. Obtaining funding from bigger banks certies that the borrowing rms are of higher
quality. Bigger banks have more-accurate screening expertise. Thus the projects that
they evaluate as being good and then invest in are more likely to be among the high
types, therefore of higher quality.27
For this result, direct empirical support is provided by Ross (2010). He documents
that loans from three dominant banks (J.P. Morgan Chase, Bank of America, and Citi-
group, accounting for more than 55% of the U.S. commercial loan market) over 20002003
induced their borrowersstock prices to jump higher, were issued at lower interest rates,
and were less likely to be protected by a borrowing base, altogether suggesting that
these banks provide a higher level of certication.(both quotations on p. 2731). Also,
Hao (2003) documents, using a sample of U.S. banks over 19881999, an inverse link be-
tween bank size and loan yield spread, which, the author suggests, may be explained by
bigger banks picking borrowers of higher credit-quality. Indirectly, Billett et al. (1995)
report, using a sample of corporate loans over 19801989, that greater abnormal returns
of the borrowersshares are associated with loans from banks with higher credit ratings,28
27Mathematically, if Ai := Ki +Di > Aj := Kj +Dj , then by (23) and @=@K > 0; pi > pj . Hence
qg(pi) > qg(pj).
28For other empirical studies on how borrowersstock prices respond to news of obtaining or renewing
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which Poon et al. (2009) show is strongly and positively correlated with bank size.29
C. The banking industry displays a trend of growing leverage. This is because small
banks keep being edged out and only big banks remain, which, by implication A, are more
leveraged.
This trend is empirically well documented; see, among others, Berger et al. (1995;
gure 1) for the U.S. over 18401990, Saunders and Wilson (1995; gures 46) for the
UK, Canada and U.S. over 18931991, Hortlund (2005; gure 2) for Sweden over 1870
2001, and Miles et al. (2012; gure 1) for the UK over 18802010.
D. An industry-wide rise in leverage tends to increase concentration in the banking
industry. This is because it enlarges the capacity of all banks and thereby intensies
competition between them, consequently edging out more small banks.
Berger, Demsetz and Strahan (1999) document that an important factor contribut-
ing to the substantial consolidation in U.S. banking industry over 19881997 (when the
number of banks fell by 30%) was the improvement in nancial conditions, such as low
interest rates, which made it more protable for banks to increase leverage. Moreover,
they nd it puzzling that M&A activity in banking appears to respond more to low
interest rates ... than does M&A activity in non-nancial industries, despite the fact that
stock deals are more common than cash acquisitions in banking ... (p. 149). This paper
gives an account for this phenomenon by showing that a larger capacity delivers greater
benets in the nancial sector than it does in a non-nancial sector. In the former, we
show in the discussion of Proposition 1(i) that a larger capacity benets a bank in both
bank loans, see, among others, Mikkelson and Partch (1986), James (1987), Lummer and McConnell
(1989), and Best and Zhang (1993).
29Moreover, Demsetz and Strahan (1997) nd that larger BHC take a greater proportion of commercial
and industrial loans relative to securities, and Akhavein et al. (1997) nd that after M&A, the consoli-
dated banks shift from securities to loans. As loans demand more screening expertise than securities to
invest, both papers suggest bigger banks have a higher level of screening expertise.
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extensive margin and prot margin, whereas in the latter, it usually delivers no benet
in prot margin. Lastly, Berger, Kashyap and Scalise (1995) nd that deregulation of
deposit ceiling rates contributed to the consolidation of the U.S. banking industry over
19791994. That is consistent with the papers ndings, because the deregulation allowed
banks to absorb more deposits, which increased leverage.
An industry-wide rise in leverage could be induced by a regulatory loophole; for ex-
ample, the o¤-balance investment vehicles to the Basel II accords.30 The thus-created
shadow banking systemcontributed substantially to the massive increase in bank lever-
age over the decade leading up to the 2008 crisis.
5 Oligopolistic Banks
In this paper, banks are modeled in perfect competition in the sense that each bank
takes entrepreneursequilibrium payo¤, b; as given. This approach o¤ers a simple way to
disentangle the two forces that this paper identies as important in shaping the economic
implications of bank size, namely, increasing returns to scale and competition. In many
real-life economies, however, the banking industry is an oligopoly. This section briey
discusses how the main results of this paper apply under such circumstances.
To simplify the exposition, consider a two-bank case, where banks 1 and 2 have funds
K1 and K2 respectively and compete for one unit of entrepreneurs; all the other aspects
are as they were modeled in section 1. Following the analysis of subsection 2.1, after
banks have chosen (pj; Rj)j=1;2, the allocation of entrepreneurs to banks, (M1;M2); and
30By Basel II, the requirement of capital bu¤er is based on the risk-weighted assets. O¤-balance
investment vehicles shift the risky assets o¤ the banks books, therefore circumvent the need to hold
capital for the assets, which allows an increase in leverage.
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the payo¤ of entrepreneurs, b; are determined by the following three equations:
l1(p1; R1) = l2(p2; R2) = b (24)






Let the solution for Mj be Mj(pj; Rj; p j; R j) for j = 1; 2:
Now consider the decisions of the two banks. As in the case of perfect competition,
it is not optimal for a bank to induce over-demand. However, unlike the previous case, a
bank can now be too large, in the sense that it is optimal for it to induce under-demand.
The paper assumes this case away because it hardly captures a real-life circumstance.
Then, given the other banks choice (p j; R j); bank j chooses (pj; Rj) such that




and its best response is to be found by solving the following problem:
max
pj ;Rj
Kj(Rj   1)  C(pj); s.t. (27). (28)
The best responses pin down the subgame perfect equilibrium.
In this setting of oligopolistic banks, as in that of perfect competition, there exist the
forces of increasing returns to scale and competition, as formally presented in Proposition
1. Because lj = 1 for j = 1; 2; it follows from (24) that Rj = R(pj; b); with R(p; b) given
by (10). Thus the objective in problem (28) is the same as that in the case of perfect
competition, given by (11). Therefore, if b could be taken as a given to a bank, then
Proposition 1 would hold here also. However, here b cannot be taken as given when
the size of one bank is changed, because now any bank has a non-neglegible e¤ect on
b. Therefore, in this setting of oligopolistic banks, the e¤ects of increasing returns to
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scale and those of competition cannot be disentangled. However, some results parallel to
Proposition 3 can be derived, as follows.
Proposition 6 Assume the two banks are of such sizes that they both choose to be in-
formed and not to induce under-demand. The subgame perfect equilibrium uniquely exists
and has the following properties.
(i) If a bank increases its size, then the payo¤ of entrepreneurs (b) increases and the
other bank lowers its screening accuracy and interest rate.
(ii) If both banks increase size without changing their market shares, then they both
lower screening accuracy and interest rate.
The proposition can be proved in the same way in which Proposition 3 is proved.
6 Conclusion
In a framework where banks can attain expertise to screen projects, while the general
public (namely households) cannot, this paper examines the causal e¤ects of bank size
for bankssurvival, asset quality and leverage. The paper nds the following.
First, banksscreening expertise generates increasing returns to scale, which help big-
ger banks survive competition better, and drive banks into a race for expansion. This race
intensies competition between banks and thereby dampens their incentives to attain or
improve screen expertise. Moreover, in this race, small banks tend to lose out, subjecting
the banking industry to a trend of increasing concentration.
Second, if all banks expand without much changing their market shares, then as a
consequence of ercer competition, their screening expertise all declines and asset quality
all falls, in spite of the increasing returns to scale.
Third, there is a complementarity between a banks leverage and the level of its screen-
ing expertise.
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Fourth, there is a sense in which banks overspend on screening expertise. If, as seems
plausible, a big fraction of this spending is used to attract human capital with high bonuses




Proof. There are two cases. First, we show that if b < d(1) 1
d(1)
S(1), a bank gets an
innitely large prot, namely, (K; b) = 1: Note rst that d() 1
d() S() is an increasing
function because both d0() > 0 and S 0() > 0: If b < d(1) 1
d(1)
S(1); there exists some
p0 2 [p; 1) such that b = d(p0) 1
d(p0) S(p
0). Then, a bank can both charge R =1; thus reaping
 = 1, and attract all the entrepreneurs by giving them more than b, as follows.
Entrepreneurspayo¤ from a deal (p;R) is (p;R) = (d(p) 1)R
d(p)R 1 S(p): It increases with p;
decreases with R, and d(p) 1
d(p)
S(p) = limR!1(p;R): If the bank o¤ers p = p0 +  < 1
and R = 1; the entrepreneurs coming to the bank get more than b: (1; p0 + ) =
d(p) 1
d(p)
S(p)jp=p0+ > d(p0) 1d(p0) S(p0) = b, where the inequality applies the fact that d() 1d() S()
is increasing as noted above.
Second, we show that(K; b) =1 if b = d(1) 1
d(1)
S(1): Let f(b; K; p) := (K (R(p; b) 
1)  C(p): Then, (K; b) = maxp2[0;1] f(b; K; p) and f 0p = Kb (d(p) 1)S0(p)+d0(p)(S(p) b)[d(p)b (d(p) 1)S(p)]2  





whereas the second one, C 0(p); by assumption, is in the order of o( 1
(1 p)2 ); dominated by
the rst term. It follows that f 0p > A
1
(1 p)2 if p > p0 for some p0 2 (0; 1) and A > 0: Then,
limp!1 f(b; K; p) = limp!1[f(b; K; p0)+R pp0 f 0pdp] > f(b; K; p0)+A  limp!1 R pp0 1(1 s)2ds =
1: That is, at b = d(1) 1
d(1)




Proof. (i) If (K; b) > 0; then K(R   1) > C((K; b)) > 0; therefore R   1 > 0:
By (11) and the envelope theorem, then, @(K; b)=@K = R((K; b); b)   1 > 0; and
@2(K; b)=@K2 = R0p  @=@K. We saw R0p > 0 if  > 0 at footnote 13. Therefore,
it su¢ ces to show @=@K > 0; for which denote the left-hand-side (LHS) term of (15)






  C 00)] and
@(K;b)
@b = @Y@b=[ (@Y@p  C 00)]: The second order condition of the maximization problem (11)
implies that @Y
@p
 C 00 < 0 at p = (K; b) := ep. Therefore, to prove @=@K > 0, it su¢ ces
to show @Y
@K
> 0, which holds true as Y is positively proportional to K.
(ii) By the envelope theorem @(K; b)=@b = K  (d(p) 1)S(p)
[d(p)b (d(p) 1)S(p)]2 jp=ep < 0. To show
@=@b < 0; by the argument above, it su¢ ces to prove that @Y




[d(ep)b (d(ep) 1)S(ep)]2 + d0(ep)  (S b)b[db (d 1)S]2 ; both terms are to be shown decreasing
with b: For the rst, (d(ep)   1)S 0(ep) > 0 and b
[d(ep)b (d(ep) 1)S(ep)]2 decreases with b forb > d(1) 1
d(1)
S(1) (by Lemma 1) and thus bigger than (d(ep) 1)
d(ep) S(ep): For the second, d0(ep) > 0
and f (S b)b
[db (d 1)S]2g0b < 0, (S   2b)[db  (d  1)S] < 2d(S   b)b: Note that  > 0 only
if S > b, namely if the surplus, S   b; that the bank gets from each project screened is
positive; and also note that db  (d 1)S > 0 by Lemma 1. Therefore, the last inequality
of the chain above holds true if S   2b < 0: If S   2b > 0; the left-hand-side of that
inequality is smaller than (S   2b)db < d(S   b)b < 2d(S   b)b; the-right-hand side.
For Proposition 2
Proof. (i): From the proof of Proposition 1, we know that @(K; b)=@K = R 1 > 0
if (K; b) > 0. Thus, (K; b) is an increasing function of K over the range where
(K; b) > 0: And (K; b)!1 if K !1: Therefore, K(b) = inffKj(K; b) > 0g is
well dened. By this denition and the increasing of  with K, K is the largest root of
(K; b) = 0 and (K; b) > 0 if and only if K > K.
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We then proceed to show K > 0: For this purpose, note that (K; b) = 0 and
(K; b) = 0 at K = 0: And also for b > d(1) 1
d(1)
S(1); (K; b) and (K; b) are continuous
with K. By the continuity there exists some " > 0 such that ep := (K; b) < p if
K < ": Then, for these K, S(ep) < 0: It follows that R(ep; b) = b
d(p)b (d(p) 1)S(p) jp=ep < 1:
Therefore, for K < "; @(K; b)=@K = R  1 < 0: As (0; b) = 0; we have (K; b) < 0
if 0 < K < "; that is, a bank of size K makes loss if it chooses to invest in screening
expertise and compete for entrepreneurs. Therefore, K(b) > " > 0:
(ii) First, @(K; b)=@KjK=K = R  1 > 0: for banks with K = K; they get 0 value if
becoming informed; and thus (R   1)K = C((K; b)) > 0: Second, by Proposition 1(ii),




Proof. To prove the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, it su¢ ces to show that
(16) and (17) have a unique solution of (t; b): For this purpose, a key role is played by
the following claim, which is proved after the proposition.
Claim A: The mass of entrepreneurs served by a bank of size K; (K; b); given




To simplify notation, let j(b) := (Kj; b): With the claim, g(b) := Z 1
0
j(b) de-
creases with b and goes to1 if b! d(1) 1
d(1)
S(1): And obviously limb!1 g(b) = 0; namely,
if entrepreneurs demand a too large payo¤ no banks are willing to serve them. Therefore,
g(b) = 1 has a unique solution, denoted by ba: Two cases may arise.
Case 1: K1  K(ba): Then, the unique solution to the simultaneous equations of (16)
and (17) is t = 1 and b = ba:
Case 2: K1 < K(ba): That is, not all banks become informed, namely, t < 1: Thus (16)
is reduced to Kt = K(b): To this equation and equation (17) we show there is a unique
33
solution. By Proposition 2(ii), K(b) is a strictly increasing function. Therefore, the
inverse function ofK(b) exists, denoted by	(K); thus, 	(K) is the level of entrepreneurs
payo¤ at which banks of size K are indi¤erent between being informed and staying out.





We now prove f(t) = 1 has a unique solution t < 1 by noting or showing the following
four points. First, f() is continuous. Second, f(0) = 0. Third, f 0(t) > 0 because
f 0(t) = t(	(Kt))+
Z t
0
0j(b)	0(Kt)dKt=dt > 0, since 0j(b) < 0 by ClaimA, dKt=dt  0
by assumption, and 	0(Kt) > 0 as 	(K) is an inverse function of K(b) and K 0(b) > 0
by Proposition 2(ii). And fourth, f(1) > 1: In this case, K1 < K(ba); which is equivalent





j(ba)jdenition of ba = 1:
(i): That is, if for any m 2 
; Km is increased, where 
 is a positively measured
subset of [0; t], then b goes up and for any j =2 
 and j  t; Rj goes down. To prove
the former result, we apply reductio ad absurdum. If, on the contrary, b non-increases,
then, K non-decreases by Proposition 2, therefore the number of informed banks is not
reduced, namely, the threshold t is not decreased. For each of the informed banks, say
bank j, by Claim A, its market share, j(b); non-decreases. But the market share of all
banks in set 
 strictly increases because their capacities are enlarged. Moreover, set 

has a positive measure. It follows that
Z t
0
j(b) is strictly increased, thus above 1, which
contradicts the market clearing condition, (17).
To prove that for any j =2 
; pj and Rj both fall, rst note that as pj = (Kj; b) and
@=@b < 0; with b rising and Kj xed, pj falls. Second, Rj as a function of pj and b;
given by (10), increases with pj and decreases with b. Then, with pj going down and b
up (as shown above), Rj decreases.
(ii): To prove the result, it su¢ ces to show that if bj is given, then dbpj=dKj < 0: Note
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that bpj satises the rst order condition, (15), with K replaced by Kj; namely,
Kj b(d(p)  1)S 0(p) + d0(p)(S(p)  b)
[d(p)b  (d(p)  1)S(p)]2 = C 0(p): (29)
To get b as a function of K and ; note that for any informed bank (p;R) = b, which,





Solving R from (5) as a function of , and substituting it into (30), we nd b related to
Kj and bj through b = d(p)  1
d(p)
(S(p) +
Kjbj )jp=bpj : (31)












Kjbj )] = C 0(p): (32)
To prove that given bj; dbpj=dKj < 0, denote the LHS of the above equation by X(p;Kj).






  C 00)]: Obviously @X
@Kj
< 0;
because S(p) > 0 and d0() > 0. Therefore, it su¢ ces to prove @X
@p
  C 00 < 0: Let
g(p;K) := d(p) 1
d(p)
(S(p)+ Kbj ): Then, b = g(bpj; Kj) by (31). Thus, X(p;K) = Y (p; g(p;K));
where Y (p; b) was used to denote the LHS of equation (15) (namely, 29 here) in the proof





@b @g@p < @Y@p , because @Y@b < 0; as was shown in the
proof of Proposition 1(ii), and @g
@p
> 0: It follows that @X
@p
 C 00 < @Y
@p
 C 00 < 0; which was
shown in the proof of Proposition 1(i).
For each informed bank j, as bpj decreases and also b increases (by result i), the interest
rate it charges, R(bpj; b); decreases, as was noted above.
For Claim A, which is used for proving Proposition 3:
Proof. By (5), (K; b) = K
E(K;b) ; where E(K; b) := ng(p)I(p;R); with p and R as
functions of (K; b) given respectively by (12) and (13). To prove that @(K; b)=@b < 0
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and @(K; b)=@K > 0; it su¢ ces to prove that E 0b > 0 and E 0K < 0. Substituting
(10) for R in I(p;R) which is given by (4), we nd E = d
d 1
b   S := f(p; b): Note
that d and S are both functions of p only, while p = (K; b) by (12). Therefore, E 0b =
@f=@p  @=@b + @f=@b and E 0K = @f=@p  @=@K. Straightforwardly @f=@b > 0: And
by Proposition 1(ii), @=@b < 0: Then, E 0b > 0 follows @f=@p < 0, ( dd 1)0pb  S 0(p) <
0jS0>0;b>0 ( ( dd 1)0p < 0,   d0(p)(d 1)2 < 0 which holds true because d0 > 0 by (3). Moreover,




(K; b) =1, it su¢ ces to prove that I(p;R) = Vg(p)
Rd(p) 1 jp;R given by (12), (13) !
0 if b! d(1) 1
d(1)
S(1); which follows from limb! d(1) 1
d(1)
S(1)
R((K; b); b) =1: For this, note
rst that by the proof of Lemma 1, if b! d(1) 1
d(1)
S(1); then p = (K; b)! 1: The LHS of
(30) thus goes to S(1) (d(1) 1)R
d(1)R 1 ; while the right-hand side, namely





Proof. To compare pj with the equilibrium quality, bpj; rewrite equation (32) that
characterizes bpj. By (10), bRj = bd(bpj)b (d(bpj) 1)S(bpj) . Substitute for b from (31), then,
bRj = 1
d(bpj)(bjS(bpj)Kj + 1): (33)
It follows that S(bpj) = (bdj bRj   1)Kj=bj: Substitute it for S(p) in (32), and bpj is then
characterized by:
bRj(bjS 0(p) + d0(p)Kjd(p)  1( bRj   1)) = C 0(p): (34)
Now we come to compare pj with bpj: Let  := d0(bpj)Kjd(bpj) 1 > 0 be a constant and p(x) be
the function implicitly dened by U(x; p) := x(bjS 0(p) + (x  1)) C 0(p) = 0 for x  1.
Then, p(1) = pj and p( bRj) = bpj: As informed banks charge bRj > 1; the proposition is
equivalent to p0(x) > 0: By the implicit function theorem, p0(x) =  U 0x=U 0p: Obviously,
U 0x > 0. Moreover, U
0
p = x
bjS 00   C 00   C 00 < 0, as S 00  0 (by 3). Thus, p0(x) > 0.
For Lemma 2:
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Proof. If out of K +D units of funds under its deployment, the bank invests M in
bad projects and K+D M in good ones, what the bank gets in each state is as follows.
In state , no projects succeed and the bank gets nothing.
In state 1, high-type projects succeed, but low types fail. By the LLN, out of all the
good projects, the fraction of high types is Pr(eq = qjes = g) := hg, while the fraction out of
the bad projects is Pr(eq = qjes = b) := hb: Hence, in state 1; fraction hg of the investment
in good projects and hb of that in bad ones succeed. Success delivers a return rate F
in the former investment and F 0 in the latter investment. Therefore, the revenue of the
bank in state 1 is (K +D M)hgF +MhbF 0 := Q(M): And its liability duty is Df: The
bank might default in this state. Its prot is then maxfQ(M) Df; 0g := 1(M):
In state 2, all the banks projects succeed. The bank does not default in the state,
or it gets 0 prot, certainly not the case. Hence, the banks prot is (K + D  M)F +
MF 0  Df := 2(M):
Altogether, the expected prot of the bank is (M) = (q   q)1(M) + q2(M). We
show this function has two local maximizers, M = 0 and M = K + D. If M is small
enough such that 1(M)  0, then
(M) = (K +D  M)F  [(q   q)hg + q] +MF 0  [(q   q)hb + q] D  qf:
Note that (q   q)hg + q = q Pr(eq = qjes = g) + q(eq = qjes = g) = qg and, similarly,
(q  q)hb+ q = qb: Therefore, (M) = (K+D)qgF  M(qgF   qbF 0) D  qf: It decreases
with M because qgF > qbF 0 by (19). Thus the maximum occurs at M = 0: If M is so big
that 1(M) = 0; then (M) = q((K + D)F +M(F 0   F )   Df): It increases with M
because F 0 > F by (19). Thus, the maximum occurs for this case at M = K +D:
To prevent the bank from investing in the evaluated bad projects, it commands (0) 
(K +D), which, by substituting (19) for F 0 and noting F = R=qg, gives rise to (20).
And (0) > (K + D) if and only if 1(M) > 0: That is, if the bank is prevented
from risk-shifting, it repays the debt in both states 1 and 2; thus with probability q:
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For Proposition 5:
Proof. By (22), L increases with d and R; both in turn increasing with p. Therefore,
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